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Abstract 
 
The level of automation around the world has grown significantly over the past few 
decades, and continues to do so. There are many reasons behind this trend, such as safety 
and potential economic benefits. However, when automation fails or behaves 
unexpectedly, the impact on the human operator can be severe. In a safety critical 
operation, such as on the bridge of a ship, the consequences could be catastrophic.  
 
The research presented in this paper aims to improve understanding in this important area 
of study for the maritime industry. An experiment was conducted to assess the awareness 
of deck officer cadets in the recognition of a developing emergency situation due to failure 
of the autopilot. Using the results from this experiment and experiences from the aviation 
industry, the paper provides a potential strategy to improve automation monitoring and 
accuracy of situation awareness. This has led to the identification of opportunities to 
improve human-machine interaction. 
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Nomenclature 
 
CAA  Civil Aviation Authority 
SA  Situation Awareness 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In safety critical industries the level of computerisation and automation has increased over the past few 
decades (Hadnett, 2008). In this context, automation has been introduced with the intention of increasing 
safety, efficiency, and productivity, and hence reducing operating costs (Harris, 2011). Commercial aviation 
was one of the leaders in this trend, with operations becoming increasingly automated in the 1980s (Sarter, 
2008). Whilst this has been a mostly successful initiative, with automation handling routine operations well 
(Onnasch et al., 2014), automation has inadvertently created new accident pathways (Lützhöft and Dekker, 
2002). 
 
Automation limitations are commonly cited as issues such as degraded manual skills, ineffective monitoring, 
inaccurate situation awareness and over-reliance (Dhami and Grabowski, 2011). Recent aircraft accidents 
related to these issues are a cause of great concern in the aviation industry (FAA, 2013). 
 
Maritime operations lag behind aviation in terms of technology introduction on the bridge (Schager, 2007), 
and so there may be scope to leverage experience from aviation to reduce the likelihood of similar 
occurrences in shipping. Alongside technology changes, the demographics of the deck officer population are 
also evolving. Over the next 15 to 20 years, a significant number of masters and officers will be reaching the 
age of retirement (Department for Transport, 2014), to be replaced with crews who have only ever 
experienced heavily automated operations. Therefore, the trends associated with the negative impacts of 
automation could become even worse.  
 
Research into the area of automation, and the interaction between human and machine, is relevant to current 
issues and future threats. This paper aims to improve understanding of automation limitations, as well as 
identifying current industry trends and ways to improve the human-automation partnership.    
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1.1. Automation Technology 
 
Automation has been defined as the mechanical or electrical accomplishment of work and in many cases it 
“involves the substitution of automation components for tasks that humans are capable of performing” 
(Wickens and Hollands, 2000). The levels of automation are typically split between (Balfe et al., 2015): 
information acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and action implementation.  
With the introduction of computerised systems, operators have become increasingly supervisory in their role 
(Meister, 1999), interacting with systems through manual and automatic control (Lee and Moray, 1994) and 
for this reason human-computer interaction became a topic of significant research interest in the 1980s 
(Guastello, 2006).  
 
Automation may be employed for a number of reasons, such as reducing workload, making up for human 
performance limitations, due to the operating environment being unsuitable for a human and/or reducing 
costs (Wickens and Hollands, 2000). Wiener and Curry (1980) and Balfe et al. (2015) considered increased 
capacity and productivity, reduced manual workload and fatigue, economical utilisation of machines, more 
precise handling of routine operations and reduced individual skills differences as benefits of automation.  
 
However, these benefits are dependent on an automated system being of good design, and the operator 
receiving sufficient training in the effective use of the system (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010). Despite the 
benefits, Wiener and Curry (1980) suggested that automation has limitations, which will contribute to 
accidents. These limitations are over-reliance and complacency, low alertness, low proficiency in manual 
skills, automation bias and automation induced failures. Bainbridge (1983) also discussed in “The ironies of 
automation” areas of manual control skills, cognitive skills and monitoring. Bainbridge mentioned that when 
automation was introduced, the operator was originally tasked to perform manual control, left to monitor the 
automation, and intervene when failure occurred. However, the net result led to deterioration of manual skills 
due to lack of practice. Although monitoring seems to be a straightforward task, most of the time the process 
or system works smoothly and there is very little to do. Therefore, the operator can find it difficult to 
maintain effective monitoring for more than half an hour, when information is largely unchanged 
(Bainbridge, 1983). Whilst automation can outperform human operators at routine tasks, when automation 
fails the effect on human performance can be catastrophic (Onnasch et al., 2014). 
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1.2. Review of accident caused by automation technology 
 
Whilst intended to reduce human error, automation systems may result in larger errors (Wiener, 1989) and as 
a result new accident sequences have been inadvertently created through automation implementation 
(Lützhöft and Dekker, 2002). 
 
Automation and its effects on the human operator in aviation has been studied for decades (Carr, 2015). 
According to the UK Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) ‘Global Fatal Accident Review 2002 – 2011’ (CAP 
1036), of the 205 accidents over that period, 62% had flight crew related factors as the primary cause, which 
could be related to degraded manual handling skills (CAA, 2013).  
 
The problems associated with ineffective monitoring and degraded situation awareness were identified by 
Wiener and Curry (1980) and this issue continued to be a concern in the 1990s (FAA, 1990; Parasuraman 
and Riley, 1997). Into the 2000s, the common theme of over-reliance on the automation, in spite of the 
guidance issued, still remains. The 2002-2011 accident data from the CAA indicates that effective 
automation monitoring remains a key concern for the aviation industry today. Combining ineffective 
monitoring, with over-reliance on automation and consequently degraded situation awareness, can lead to a 
startled response when faced with sudden automation failure (Jarvis et al., 2014). This in turn can lead to 
poor performance from the crew, and the loss of the aircraft.  
 
Similar situations could happen in the shipping industry and it is worthwhile to learn lessons from the 
aviation industry. A ship’s navigating bridge could be considered equivalent to the aeroplane cockpit. A 
ship’s bridge has positions for navigation, traffic surveillance and manoeuvring, route planning, 
communications and safety operations, manual steering, and docking operations (Linna, 2005). On modern 
vessels, separate pieces of equipment, such as a Global Positioning System (GPS), electronic charts and 
depth sounders, are integrated into one main system (Belev, 2004). An integrated system must decide what 
information to display, and in some cases, what actions to take based on that information (Mills, 2006). A 
typical integrated bridge system is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: A typical integrated bridge system (Sperry Marine, 2014) 
 
However, the increased levels of technology and automation on the bridge have not been trouble free (Mills, 
2006) (Schager, 2007). Hadnett (2008) states: 
 “The relentless drive within the shipping community to introduce electronic navigation aids to 
merchant ships had the principal stated objective of improving safety by enhancing situational 
awareness. However, some of the doubts expressed at the inception of these initiatives regarding 
their likely success have been realised, in that there is now a commonly held view that the general 
standard of bridge watch-keeping has been eroded, leading to several collisions and groundings.”  
In light of accidents due to automation failure, the Short Course Programme in Automated System in 
Shipping (SURPAS), an EU funded project, provided specialist training to seafarers to understand the 
automation systems and enable them to comprehend the weaknesses and limitations of such systems. In the 
initial stage of the project, in reviewing sea accident investigations, it was found that 60% of shipping 
accidents are due to human error. In this study it was concluded that better education and training is one of 
the solutions to potentially reduce such accidents. They also proposed cooperation between users and 
producers of automated systems to create a platform for transfer of knowledge and ultimately eliminate man-
machine interface problem (SURPASS, 2012).  
 
1.3. Human Factors related to accidents 
 
Human Factors, as a research topic, is a “multifaceted subject drawing on psychology, sociology, physiology 
and medicine, engineering and management science” (Harris, 2011). As 80% of accidents in high risk 
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industries can be attributed to human error (O’Connor et al., 2008), there is a clear benefit to understanding 
the human-machine interaction.  
 
Both technical and human action barriers are built into a well-designed system, with a view to improving 
resilience. This is in order to protect both humans and machines from each other’s weaknesses (Re and 
Macchi, 2010). Human and machine related errors need to line up to create a pathway for an accident 
sequence to propagate and pass through what should have been barriers. Human factors in relation to the 
automation technology that contribute to the occurrence of an accident are human error, lack of situation 
awareness, automation complacency and automation bias. 
 
1.3.1. Human Error 
 
Consistent definitions of human error are summarised by (Wickens and Hollands, 2000), who suggest that 
error can occur if the operator interprets the situation incorrectly, the action decided upon is incorrect, or the 
action decided upon may not be carried out correctly. The performance of a particular individual, and so the 
likelihood of error, can be influenced by many factors such as skill, experience, age, fatigue, humidity and 
noise (Park, 2011). Hetherington et al. (2006) reviewed the literature on safety in shipping and addressed 
human error failures at design, personnel and organisational levels. In their review, they highlighted the most 
common human error factors were due to misjudgement and improper lookout or watch keeping. In another 
related study, Turan et al. (2016) presented the outcome of the SEAHORSE project focused on safety in 
marine transport and addressed human and organisational factors. In their analytical study, they found over 
50% of underlying accidents were attributed to human error out of which the majority was due to inattention 
followed by inadequate communication and situation awareness.   
  
With the exception of intentional violation, people do not set out to cause injury, death or damage as a result 
of their error. After all, an operator’s own life may be at risk as the scenario plays out. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it can be all too easy to criticise the incorrect actions performed by the human operator (Perrow, 
1984). Therefore, the emphasis of human error study should not be on blame, but on understanding why the 
error has occurred and asking “why did this action or assessment make sense to people at that time and 
place?” (Lützhöft and Dekker, 2002). However, in the SAFETY II approach, it is suggested to look for what 
goes right as well as what goes wrong. It also suggests that “the purpose of investigation is to understand 
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how tings usually go right as a basis for explaining how things occasionally go wrong” (Hollnagel, E et al. 
2013). With this mind-set, the opportunity exists to learn and so to implement changes to prevent 
reoccurrence. 
 
1.3.2. Situation Awareness 
 
Situation awareness may be defined as the need to understand the current state and project the future state of 
a system (Sneddon et al., 2013) in order to maintain safe operations. Accurate situation awareness is critical 
in the operator’s decision making process (Craig, 2012) and requires the dynamics of the situation and the 
external environment to be understood (Wickens and Hollands, 2000). Situation awareness requires an 
accurate mental model, which is defined as a person’s understanding of how a system functions and how its 
current state may develop based on the known parameters (Endsley, 2012). If a highly complex system is not 
perfectly reliable, an operator’s situation awareness can be degraded (Onnasch, 2015). Once situation 
awareness is degraded, operators are slower to detect problems and require time to re-orientate themselves 
with the situation and the system (Endsley, 1995).  
 
1.3.3. Automation Complacency  
 
Humans can become complacent with any task and environment, from a simple manual routine to the use of 
automated bridge equipment (Squire, 2009). Operators of highly automated systems may perceive 
themselves to be in a supervisory role ((Onnasch, 2015). In time, the operator starts to assume that the 
system is infallible, and so will no longer actively monitor what is happening, meaning they have become 
complacent (Mosier et al., 2013). Automation complacency reduces effectiveness in monitoring as the 
operator assumes that the system is reliable and therefore failure detection deteriorates. In another study on 
effectiveness of automation monitoring by Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) it was concluded that operators 
of constantly high reliability systems were 50% less likely to detect failures, than operators of unreliable 
systems. However, it is worthwhile to mention that complacency only becomes a problem when automation 
fails (Wickens and Hollands, 2000). 
 
1.3.4. Automation Bias 
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Automation bias is a term applied when humans perceives automation “as powerful agents with superior 
analysis capability” (Lee and See, 2004). Operators can trust the automated system so much that they ignore 
other sources of information, including their own senses (Carr, 2015). Automation bias can be particularly 
powerful when the operator experiences confirmation bias. This is when humans seek information that 
confirms their current understanding of a situation, ignoring any evidence against the held belief. When 
faced with supposedly exact information from an electronic source, humans can disregard their own senses 
(Schager, 2007). Therefore, if the automation agrees with the held belief of the situation, then any other 
information will likely be ignored, resulting in poor decision making (Parasuraman and Manzey, 2010). 
Operators are particularly at risk from the bias effect at times of high stress (Sneddon et al., 2013), when task 
saturation occurs and performance is already low.  
 
2. Materials and Methods  
 
The maritime industry has realised, despite increased safety standards and technological improvements 
including automation, accidents still occur. Some EU funded projects (SEAHORSE, 2016 and SURPASS, 
2012) and research reviewed the literature in shipping accidents and highlighted that the failure in 
automation may bring serious causalities. In this paper, the authors conduct a pilot study monitoring the 
performance of 12 deck officer cadets using simulation video and endeavouring to understand the attitudes 
(e.g. level of trust in automation) of future seagoing deck officers towards shipboard automation.  In the 
selection process for the test subjects, the aim was to have people with similar seagoing experience, but as far 
as possible from different age groups, so that the effect of specific training could be highlighted in the results 
of this pilot study. It should be noted that the number of available participants meeting this requirement was 
relatively small.     
 
2.1. Automation Monitoring Experimental Setup 
 
An experiment was planned and carried out to assess whether highly reliable automation in the shipping 
industry can lead to ineffective monitoring and inaccurate situation awareness by the operator, as well as to 
trial a strategy to improve operator monitoring effectiveness. During the initial stage of the research an 
experiment was designed and necessary materials were developed. The material prepared for the experiment 
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included series of recorded simulation videos, briefing video, paper charts, questionnaire and data recording 
sheet. A pilot study was then conducted and the resulting data collected for analysis. 
 
A large container vessel was chosen as the case ship for this experiment, consisting of an interactive bridge 
watch simulation. A series of scenarios were set in the developed simulation and two major faults were 
introduced: “Possible traffic conflict” and “Deviation from course”. Initially, in order to build trust in the test 
subjects, the bridge watch simulation system functioned as it should, as if automation correctly controlled the 
situation. In the second scenario, a traffic hazard situation was defined in the simulation, which eventually 
would have triggered an alarm to alert the test subject. In the final scenario, a subtle autopilot failure 
occurred and the vessel made a gradual, unexpected turn without an alarm to notify the test subject. The test 
measured how quickly the failure was noticed (i.e. recognition time), and accuracy of situation awareness. 
Table 1 shows the scenarios.  
 
Table 1: Automation monitoring experiment scenarios. 
 
Video Simulation Change Alarm Triggered 
1 Briefing 
2 None None 
3 Possible traffic conflict Traffic alert 
4 Deviation from course None 
 
 
The simulations were recorded with a VSTEP Ship Simulator 2008 (VSTEP, 2008), and a voiceover was 
recorded to give a set of packaged videos. Test subjects had sufficient opportunities to identify changes 
visually such as clouds in the sky, vessel position relative to the coastline, and heel motion. Figure 2 shows a 
screenshot of a typical video in the set of scenarios.  
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Figure 2: A screenshot of a video from experiment 
Each simulation scenario was planned to run for 5 minutes and the test subject could show their concern, 
indicating their navigational awareness, by an alarm or show of hand followed by noting down what they 
have noticed. In the final scenario, deviation from course commenced after 2 minutes until the end of the 
simulation. Test subjects were expected to notice the change in course anytime within the 3 minutes. By the 
end of the simulation, if any test subject didn’t notice the deviation, it would be considered as failure to 
recognise. 
 
To recreate workload on the bridge, a set of questions was created, for completion during the experiment. 
Nested within the questionnaire were questions containing background information, training received and 
that would indicate current attitude towards automation, such as level of trust and automation complacency. 
The level of automation trust amongst the experiment participants was scored on a scale of 1 to 5, where for 
the strength of agreement, 1 is ‘Strongly Disagree’, 3 is ‘Neither Agree or Disagree’ and 5 is ‘Strongly 
Agree.  
 
2.2. Experiment Procedure 
 
The automation monitoring experiment was conducted with deck officer cadets from a local maritime school. 
All of test subjects (deck officer cadets) who were selected had similar seagoing experience of about 6 
months required for their maritime studies, but they were from different age groups. The requirement for the 
test subjects to have similar experience limited the number of available candidates. The experiment took 
11 
 
place in an air-conditioned classroom style environment, with typical desks and cushioned chairs. The test 
subjects came into the room individually, at pre-booked time slots, and were guided to sit directly in front of 
a projector screen. A watch handover procedure was performed by the researcher with each test subject, 
explaining the watch keeping situation, as if they are taking over the watch.  The lights were dimmed whilst 
the videos were played. During the experiment, only the researcher and test subject were present in the room. 
 
Twelve people took part in this experiment, which was carried out in June 2015. Half of the test subjects 
received basic training, while the other half did not receive it. The aim here was to highlight the influence of 
appropriate training on the responses of test subjects, by training 50% of the limited number of candidates. 
The basic training consisted of a run through of the passage plan and a reminder of their responsibility for 
safe navigation. For the “Trained Group” paper charts were also provided overlaid with the route taken in the 
simulation videos as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Overlaid passage chart 
  
2.3. Experiment Results 
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The results from the simulation experiments were logged for analysis. They consisted of the training level, 
i.e. whether the test subject had received basic training, whether or not the subject recognised the failure and 
if so, the recognition time. In addition, results from the questionnaire were also collated in terms of 
automated system training, level of trust and navigation awareness course. Table 2 shows the summary of the 
number of people who had accurate or inaccurate situation awareness (SA) during the final simulation video. 
In this case, accurate situation awareness is defined as the recognition of the unexpected turn to port, whilst 
the course indicator showed no deviation.  
 
Table 2: Automation Monitoring Experiment results 
Test 
Subject 
Age Simulation Questionnaire 
Training Recognised 
failure 
Recognition 
time( Sec) 
Automated 
systems 
training 
Level of trust 
in automated 
system 
Navigation 
awareness 
course 
1 25-28 Yes Yes 59 Yes 4 Yes 
2 21-24 Yes Yes 77 Yes 5 Yes 
3 21-24 Yes Yes 104 Yes 5 Yes 
4 21-24 Yes Yes 119 Yes 4 Yes 
5 21-24 Yes Yes 161 Yes 5 Yes 
6 21-24 Yes No 180 Yes 5 Yes 
7 29-32 No Yes 41 Yes 5 Yes 
8 25-28 No No 180 Yes 5 Yes 
9 21-24 No No 180 Yes 4 Yes 
10 25-28 No No 180 Yes 3 Yes 
11 21-24 No No 180 Yes 5 Yes 
12 21-24 No No 180 Yes 5 Yes 
 
During each experiment, observations of the behaviour of the test subjects were also made. Of particular 
interest, were the different approaches taken to completing the task. Some subjects were fully engaged with 
completing the questionnaire, while keeping an eye on the simulation video. These subjects basically failed 
to recognise the autopilot failure, whereas the more effective strategy was to balance disciplined watch 
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keeping with the additional task requirements. When questioned after the video, the subjects who failed to 
identify the situation felt that the vessel was operating normally in the final voyage. The observations made 
in this experiment revealed that performing two concurrent tasks, watch keeping and completing the 
questionnaire, could lead to ineffective situation awareness. 
 
2.4. Data Analysis  
 
For ease of analysis, recognition time was recorded as 180 seconds for those who failed to identify the 
unexpected autopilot behaviour. According to the data in Table 2, 50% of the test subjects didn’t recognise 
the failure, indicating inaccurate situation awareness. The results show that of those trained, 5 out of 6, 
recognised the failure (83%) whereas without training, 5 out of 6 test subjects (again 83%) failed to 
recognise it. This emphasises the importance of training for situation awareness and safety. Interestingly the 
test subject with the lowest recognition time (41 seconds), meaning the most effective situation awareness, 
didn’t receive training.  
 
When time to recognise that the autopilot has failed is compared with the level of trust placed in automation, 
there is no definite correlation, as the test subject with the lowest trust did not recognise the failure. In 
contrast, the shortest recognition time was by a test subject who had the highest level of trust. However, the 
result shows that there is a tendency towards having high trust in the automation.  
 
Following the age band of the test subjects, Table 2 shows that there were mixed results for the 21 to 24 year 
olds, and the 25 to 28 year olds. Of particular interest, when recognition times of those subjects who 
identified failure were plotted against their age group, as shown in Figure 4, it was revealed that the most 
mature and experienced person, the one subject in the 29 to 32 age group, had the fastest response in 
recognising the failure. However, a larger number of test subjects is required before any conclusions may be 
drawn from this. It is the intention of the authors to conduct the larger scale study following the successful 
outcome of this pilot investigation. 
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Figure 4: Recognition time against age group of test subjects identified failure 
3. Discussion 
 
3.1. Automation Limitations and Experiences 
 
In parallel to conducting this small scale experiment, some case studies from major aviation accidents that 
have strong links to automation shortcomings, were reviewed and key findings and learning outcomes were 
identified. In this review, there were examples of complex interactions between technical and human 
performance weaknesses, which led to a situation from which recovery was not possible. Automation 
limitations such as poor situation awareness, delegated authority and ineffective monitoring were identified 
in the aviation accident cases reviewed (NTSB, 2014). 
 
In the small scale experiment, the level of automation failure recognition was considered as poor. Half of the 
test subjects failed to effectively monitor the vessel’s progress under the autopilot, and when questioned had 
incorrect situation awareness.  
 
After the earlier videos, where the automated systems function normally, a level of trust was established. 
Therefore, a degree of complacency may have been present. This complacency may explain why, for some 
test subjects, the questionnaire was of much greater interest. A mentality of ‘the autopilot has the vessel, I 
can complete the other activity’ may have been experienced. 
 
The course indicator remaining around the initial course steered by the autopilot could have also led to 
automation bias. A quick glance back at the screen would confirm the course was unchanged, before 
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returning to complete the questionnaire. Greater weight was attributed to the information provided 
electronically and therefore the subtle turn of the vessel, and associated visual clues, went unnoticed. 
 
3.2. Improving Automation Monitoring 
 
From the aviation case studies considered in Section 1, a common strategy currently being employed in the 
industry  is to remind airline pilots of their ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of their aircraft 
(Jarvis et al., 2014). The aim is to encourage active monitoring and improve the individual pilot’s mental 
models of the situation.  
 
Deck officers and masters are operating complex machines in a challenging and dynamic environment. Once 
underway, there may be many days of low workload and low stimulation, as the officers monitor the vessel’s 
progress under very reliable autopilot control, with minimal opportunities to use manual skills. There are 
similarities to the working conditions of an airline pilot, and so the strategy of active monitoring was 
considered as potentially useful in maritime operations. The experiment provided an opportunity to test out 
the strategy, and the results were promising. Test subjects were split into two groups, with one set provided 
with coaching along the lines of the guidance issued in the aviation industry. Test subjects were provided 
with a passage plan to build a mental model of the voyage and reminded of their ultimate responsibility for 
safe vessel navigation. 
It should be noted that the study population was diverse from ethnicity and gender perspectives, however, 
this pilot study had a small sample size and hence no tangible outcome measures with regard to ethnicity and 
gender could be drawn. The experiment, nevertheless, showed that the more consistently good performance 
was from the trained group. It is possible that the passage plan improved the subject’s mental model of the 
planned voyage, and the reminder of responsibilities kept test subjects engaged with the most important task 
of all, safe navigation. However, the hypothesis of improved performance due to training cannot be 
conclusive until a higher number of experiments is conducted. 
 
3.3. Technical Improvements and Training 
 
Over the past thirty years, design methods associated with automation systems have remained unchanged 
(Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). Confusing automation logic results in a mental model that is inaccurate. 
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Results from the experiment suggest that accurate mental models are key to recognising automation failure. 
Going forward, the emphasis on automation design should be on creating an effective partnership between 
the human and the machine (Geiselman et al., 2013). Systems should have sufficient resilience, such that no 
single-point failure can lead to a critical event (Hsieh et al., 2010). This may be through equipment design 
and redundancy, or through hardware and software barriers. 
 
In aviation, Harry Nelson, Executive Operational Advisor at Airbus, recently stated that training should 
move towards building resilience so that emergencies can be tackled confidently and new safety approaches 
shared (Pasztor, 2015). Bainbridge suggested solution for effective monitoring especially in case of complex 
modes of operation is updating manual skills of operator by allowing them to practice on regular basis 
including training by simulator. It was also suggested that any simulators used for training should also be 
similarly dynamic (Bainbridge, 1983).  This could be implemented in a maritime context using bridge 
simulators for training operators (deck officers in this case) where their manual skills be improved and 
provided with the appropriate information by technology in a timely manner. 
 
The strategy for improving situation awareness, as trialled in the experiment, will require resources for 
implementation. As the technique is simple, this should not be a major undertaking and could be 
communicated with an operational circular. Training could be delivered by masters coaching their officers, 
or could be incorporated into bridge resource management courses. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This research aimed to improve understanding of automation limitations, as well as identify and evaluate 
current industry trends and efforts to improve the human-automation partnership. To achieve this, an 
extensive study was conducted, utilising a variety of data collection streams. 
 
The review of recent aviation accidents highlighted the influence of automation on human performance, with 
limitations such as automation complacency. Focusing on ineffective automation monitoring and the 
associated degradation of situation awareness, the experiment found half of test subjects did not recognise 
subtle automation failure, although it should be noted that these preliminary results are from the very small 
number of appropriate test subjects who were available. The study showed the positive relationship between 
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level of trust and perceived accuracy of situation awareness enabled by bridge technology. A strategy to 
improve situation awareness showed promise in the small scale experiment conducted. 
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